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Abstract
Loss of use is fundamentally about the denial of property rights
regardless of its intended use. Property ownership vests the owner with
certain intrinsic rights, including the right to use or not use. When they
are deprived of that choice through the tortious conduct of another, that
deprivation is compensable. This Article reviews the historical origins
of loss of use law to determine that tort victims denied the right to use
their property must be compensated regardless of how they would have
chosen to use their property. Because these damages do not depend on
the owner’s actual use, loss of use should be thought of as loss of right to
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use. The Article then aims to define fair and reasonable compensation
by arguing that the proper measure of damages for loss of right to use
is daily market rental value for the period of deprivation. This simplified
definition provides courts with a workable measure of damages that
alleviates the need for judicial speculation while holding true to the goal
of placing tort victims back in their original position.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Property ownership includes the intrinsic right to use one’s
property as desired as long as it is within the bounds of the law. The
owner of real property or chattel may choose to use it for pleasure, for
profit, or for nothing at all. The choice is theirs to make. When they
are deprived of that choice through the tortious conduct of another,
that deprivation is compensable. Loss of right to use damages are an
attempt to put the property owner back in their original position as if
the wrongful conduct never occurred. On the surface, this is a simple
task. In practice, however, there have been great debates as to how
and to what extent this goal should be met for loss of right to use
damages. As with all tort damages, the goal is to provide the victim
with fair and reasonable compensation. Courts on both sides of the
Atlantic have debated what fair and reasonable compensation means,
while worries over preserving fundamental property rights have been
met with concerns about overcompensating tort victims.
Formulating a definition for fair and reasonable compensation
becomes a much simpler task after one clearly defines the harm for
which compensation is being sought. For example, if an automobile is
damaged in a collision, it must be repaired. Making such repairs may
involve handing over the automobile to a third party, meaning the
owner is deprived of its use during such period of time. He may have
chosen to let it sit in a vacant lot, drive it around the countryside, or
rent it out for a profit. Regardless of what he would have actually
chosen to do, he has suffered a loss because that choice has already
been made for him. Thus, damages commonly referred to as “loss of
use” are more appropriately damages for “loss of right to use.” It is
the owner’s right to use his property that is being compensated as
opposed to his real, intended, or prospective use of the property.
Because a court can only speculate as to how a tort victim could or
should have used their property, courts should adopt a general rule
for loss of use damages where no specific loss of profit can be proven.
Analysis and trending dictate that a general rule should define fair and
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reasonable compensation for loss of right to use as the daily rental
value multiplied by the days of deprivation. Unless a plaintiff can
show they would have used the property in a more profitable
manner—such as part of a business enterprise—rental value
represents an easily obtainable and easily understood estimate of the
value of a property’s use.
This Article proceeds in four parts. After this introduction, Part I
reviews the historical origins behind loss of right to use damages.
This will demonstrate why the intrinsic right to use one’s property is
essential to understanding how it should be compensated. Part II
discusses the evolution of loss of right to use throughout England and
the United States to argue that English admiralty law is responsible
for the current state of the doctrine. Part III summarizes loss of right
to use in Connecticut, whose loss of right to use law is among the
oldest and most cited in the United States. Finally, Part IV aims to
provide a clear measure for courts to determine fair and reasonable
compensation for loss of right to use based on market rental value.
The Article concludes with a summary of the underlying principles
supporting a clear measure of damages for loss of right to use.
II.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF LOSS OF RIGHT TO USE

A. English Admiralty Law & Lord Halsbury’s Theory of Property
Rights
The concept of recovering damages for the loss of use of chattel
originates from English admiralty law. Courts in England have long
awarded demurrage charges to compensate shipowners for the loss
of use of their vessels due to improper delay or detention.1 Actions
for demurrage were usually the result of a vessel’s extended detention
for loading or unloading or delays occurring before or during the
ship’s voyage. Ships held for any time beyond the allowable set of
loading days, called lay-days, were subject to demurrage charges
based on the number of days the vessel was detained.2 These were
often included as express contractual provisions in the charter-party

1. See Theodore M. Etting, Demurrage, in 6 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 542, 542–43 (John Houston Merill ed., Edward Thompson Co.
1888).
2. See EDWARD LAWES, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CHARTER-PARTIES OF AFFREIGHTMENT,
BILLS OF LADING, AND STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU 129–30 (1813).
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or bill of lading but were also awarded under a theory of implied
contract.3
Under a strict definition, demurrage only arises from contract.4
However, loss of use damages recovered in tort cases involving vessel
collisions or wrongful seizures have also been called demurrage.5
Courts in England commonly awarded compensation to shipowners
deprived of the use of their vessels due to repair or other forms of
detention not arising from breach of contract.6 Regardless of whether
the action is one of contract or tort, the reasoning behind demurrage
is that any delay or detention in the return of a vessel deprived the
shipowner of his right to use the vessel. Such a delay would
reasonably be expected to result in a loss of income or in some
circumstances the expense of renting a substitute vessel. Thus,
demurrage is a mechanism to compensate the shipowner for his
losses or added expenses associated with the delay.
English courts were originally split as to whether the shipowner
would have to incur an actual loss before recovering for demurrage.7
Where the shipowner could not show that he would have used the
vessel for profit, some courts refused to award demurrage.8 That is,
some courts required that the shipowner show he was deprived of his
loss of use, not his loss of the right to use.9 The law in England was
not settled until the turn of the twentieth century when the House of
Lords decided The Greta Holme10 and The Mediana.11 Both decisions
stand for the principle that compensation is to be awarded based on
the value of a vessel’s potential use regardless of how the vessel was
actually used or if it was used at all.12 Lord Halsbury illustrated this
principle well in The Mediana: “Suppose, for example, someone went
into my house and took away a chair and retained it for some months,
3. See Etting, supra note 1, at 543.
4. See id. at 542.
5. See The Inflexible (1857) 1094–95; Swab. 200; see also The Clarence (1850)
166 Eng. Rep. 1, 968–69; 3 W. Rob. 283, 283–87.
6. See David R. Owen, The Origins and Development of Marine Collision Law, 51
TUL. L. REV. 759, 767–71 (1977).
7. See Note, Damages: Objective Determination of the Value of the Use of a Chattel,
39 HARV. L. REV. 760, 760 (1926) [hereinafter Damages] (discussing the “vacillating
course of the English decisions on this point.”).
8. See, e.g., The City of Peking [1889] 15 AC 438; The Argentino [1889] 59 LT 1
AC at 914–18.
9. See Damages, supra note 7, at 760.
10. See id. (referring to The Greta Holme [1897] AC 596).
11. See id. (referring to The Mediana [1900] AC 113).
12. See id.
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could anyone say that I as owner am entitled to no reparation on the
ground that I have other chairs or that I was not in the habit of sitting
upon that particular chair?”13 Lord Herschell agreed, stating in The
Greta Holme that he believed it was “clear law that in general a person
who has been deprived of the use of a chattel through the wrongful
act of another is entitled to recover damages . . . even though he cannot
prove . . . [a] ‘tangible pecuniary loss.’”14 The Greta Holme and The
Mediana were highly influential and followed by courts in England
and around the world.15 A few years later, The Astrakhan16
“represented the high point of British admiralty cases endorsing the
recovery of the abstract and hypothetical use value of a vessel.” 17
There, a Danish warship suffered damage in a collision immediately
before three months of scheduled maintenance. The court found that
damages were appropriate because the Danish government was
deprived of the ship’s potential use and would be unable to make use
of her if some unforeseen event occurred.18 In the 1920s, however, in
deciding The Valeria19 and The Susquehanna,20 the English Court
briefly returned to the old rule requiring actual loss before
compensation is awarded. Though Lord Halsbury’s argument would
eventually prevail,21 the English Court’s lack of consistency had a
profound impact on the law of loss of right to use in the United States.
B.

Adoption of English Admiralty Law in the United States

Courts in the United States have often turned to English common
law when deciding damages for loss of use. The Apollon was the first

13. [1900] AC 113 at 117.
14. [1897] AC 596 at 604.
15. See Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co. of N.Y., 92 A. 413 (Conn. 1914) (citing and
agreeing with The Greta Holme and The Mediana); C.W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated
Ry. Co., 85 N.E. 446 (Mass. 1908) (adopting Lord Halsbury’s rule from The Greta
Holme and The Mediana); The King v. Mason, [1933] S.C.R. 332 (Can.) (demonstrating
how Canadian courts were influenced by The Greta Holme and The Mediana); Pix v
Suncoast Marine Pty Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Queensland, Holmes J, 8
March 2019) 45 (Austl.) (showing how Australian courts were similarly influenced).
16. See [1910] 102 LT 1 P at 539–42.
17. Alan E. Brownstein, What’s the Use? A Doctrinal and Policy Critique of the
Measurement of Loss of Use Damages, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 433, 488 (1985).
18. See The Astrakhan [1910] 102 LT 1 P at 542.
19. See [1922] 2 AC 242.
20. See [1926] 134 LT 1 AC at 46–50.
21. See infra Section II.
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demurrage case heard by the United States Supreme Court.22 Writing
for the Court, Justice Story rejected the argument that demurrage
could only arise through contract and found it was the proper
measure of compensation for the illegal seizure of a vessel because it
represents the “ship’s expenses, wear and tare, and common
employment.”23 Demurrage could therefore be awarded for any
improper delay or detention of a vessel.24 For many years, federal
courts followed the original English rule by requiring that plaintiffs
show a loss of profits before allowing recovery for loss of use. For
example, in Williamson v. Barrett, the Court followed the English
admiralty court’s decision to find that a plaintiff can recover
compensation for “the capacity of the vessel to earn freight . . . and
consequent loss sustained while deprived of her service” based on the
market value of the hire of the vessel.25 A similar holding was reached
in The Potomac where the Court found the market price of the vessel’s
hire or evidence of a loss of profit to be the “test of the sum to be
recovered.”26 In The Conqueror, the Court described demurrage as a
well-settled element of damages in English and American common
law.27 Citing both The Apollon and a string of English cases, the Court
recognized limits to recovery. For example, under the English rule,
stated by Dr. Lushington in The Clarence, “two things are absolutely
necessary,—actual loss, and reasonable proof of the amount.”28 To
the Supreme Court, the best evidence of actual loss was “the sum for
which vessels of the same size and class can be chartered in the
market.”29
The Conqueror was decided just months before the House of
Lords handed down The Greta Holme decision, which rejected the
actual loss rule that the Supreme Court cited positively in The
Clarence.30 By the time the actual loss rule returned in The Valeria,
many American state courts had already cited The Greta Holme and
The Mediana in non-admiralty cases to hold that compensation was
appropriate when a property owner had been deprived of his right to
22. See 22 U.S. 362 (1824).
23. Id. at 378.
24. See Theodore M. Etting, Demurrage, 32 AM. L. REG. 153, 154 (1884).
25. 54 U.S. 101, 111 (1851).
26. 105 U.S. 630, 632 (1881).
27. See 166 U.S. 110, 125 (1897).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 127.
30. The Conqueror was decided on March 8, 1897 and The Greta Holme was
decided on July 29, 1897.
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use the property, regardless of whether he would have in fact done so.
These early cases often involved automobiles used for pleasure and
judges were aware of the important role automobiles played in
American society. Unlike a pleasure yacht that may go unused for
weeks or months at a time, automobiles quickly became important
modes of transportation. Courts took advantage of the changing
British authority, and Lord Halsbury’s argument was persuasive and
“went unchallenged during the period American state courts first
confronted the pleasure-auto issue.”31
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co.
of New York, examined the conflict between the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in The Conqueror and the House of Lords’
decisions in The Mediana and The Greta Holme.32 The court
distinguished the holding in The Conqueror and noted that courts in
other states, such as the Massachusetts court in C.W. Hunt Co. v. Boston
Elevated Railway Co.,33 have chosen to adopt Lord Halsbury’s rule.34
The Connecticut court decided to follow Lord Halsbury’s reasoning
and stated, “[w]e fail to see why the character of the intended use
should determine the right to a recovery . . . .”35 It went on to rule that
evidence of the automobile’s rental value was admissible as to show
the value of its use.36
Perkins v. Brown involved the loss of use of a vehicle due to an
automobile accident.37 The defendant argued that no damages for loss
of use should be awarded because the owner of the vehicle used it for
pleasure and had not incurred any expenses in order to use another
vehicle. The court rejected this argument, citing Lord Halsbury’s
opinion in The Mediana holding that demurrage was appropriate even
where obtaining a substitute vessel did not result in an expense to the
shipowner.38 However, the Tennessee court did limit the use of rental
value as a measure of damage to only cover the time the plaintiff
would normally use the vehicle. Despite this, courts following the
general rule of Perkins have ignored that limitation. For example, the
Illinois Court of Appeals in McCabe v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Brownstein, supra note 17, at 493.
See 92 A. 413, 416 (Conn. 1914).
See 84 N.E. 446 (Mass. 1908).
Cook, 92 A. at 416.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416.
See 177 S.W. 1158, 1160 (Tenn. 1915).
See id. at 1159.
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Co. cited Perkins when awarding loss of use damages when delivery of
an automobile was delayed.39 Even though the automobile owner did
not rent a replacement and would not have used it for business
purposes, the court decided that his “right of use, enjoyment,
possession and disposition of the machine is not limited by the use
which he made of it . . . .”40
In another early automobile case, the court in Dettmar v. Burns
Bros. looked to The Mediana and The Greta Holme to support its
finding that an automobile owner may recover for loss of right to use
even if the vehicle was only used for pleasure.41 The court based its
decision on the ground that a property owner’s right to use their
property is not reduced by the manner in which the owner uses it.
“The right of an owner of the chattel to the use of his property is not
diminished by the use the owner makes of it.”42 The court continued
to say that the owner’s “right to use [their property], whether for
business or pleasure, is absolute, and whoever injures the owner in
the exercise of that right renders himself liable for consequent
damages.”43
Similar arguments were also made in state courts in cases
involving other forms of property. For example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts cited extensively to The Mediana and The
Greta Holme in C.W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.44 The
court applied the reasoning of both decisions to decide the railway
company was entitled to the rental value of their property even
though it was not commonly rented or intended to be rented.45 The
construction company’s delays deprived them of the right to use the
property and the rental value was an appropriate measure of those
damages.
So long as the Hunt Company was at work on the
towers after the time for completion of them had
passed, the railway company was thereby deprived of
all return from its investment in these four items of
39. See 215 Ill. App. 99, 104 (1919).
40. Id. at 102.
41. See 181 N.Y.S. 146, 147–48 (App. Div. 1920).
42. Id. at 147.
43. Id.
44. See 84 N.E. 446, 450–51 (Mass. 1908).
45. See id. at 450 (“A man who has been deprived of his property is not
precluded from recovering therefor because the property in question is not
‘commonly rented.’”).
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property, and to that extent the decisions in The
Gr[e]ta Holme and The Mediana are applicable.46
More recent cases demonstrate the state courts’ widespread
commitment to these principles. Additionally, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 928 and 931 have helped push state courts
towards the simplified approach advocated by Lord Halsbury over a
century ago. Restatement § 928 states that one may recover (a) “the
difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the
value after the harm or . . . the reasonable cost of repair or restoration
. . . and (b) the loss of use.”47 The commentary to subsection (b) refers
to § 931, which provides that when one is entitled to recover for
detention or deprivation real or personal property, compensation
may include “(a) the value of the use during the period of detention or
prevention or the value of the use of or the amount paid for a
substitute, and (b)harm to the subject matter or other harm of which
the detention is the legal cause.”48 The commentary to subsection (a)
of § 931 continues by saying an owner is “entitled to recover as
damages for the loss of the value of the use, at least the rental value of
the chattel . . . .”49 This is the case “even though the owner in fact has
suffered no harm through the deprivation, as when he was not using
the subject matter at the time . . ..”50
A New York Appellate Court in Mountain View Coach Lines, Inc. v.
Storms reversed a judgment refusing to award damages for loss of use
of a commercial bus where the plaintiff did not hire a substitute bus.51
Citing the Restatement § 931, the New York court held that “where a
motor vehicle is harmed as a result of a tortious act, the plaintiff is
46. Id. at 451.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 928 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
48. See id. at cmt. b; id. § 931.
49. Id. § 931 cmt. b. “A detains B’s automobile for a period of one month. The car
was used merely for B’s pleasure and during this month B does not use another car.
The rental value of the car is $50 for that period. B is entitled to damages of $50.” Id.
at cmt. b, illus. 2.
50. Id. § 931 cmt. b. “The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that at the time
of the deprivation, B had put the car up for the winter, did not intend to use it and did
not discover the loss until after it had been returned. The damages based upon rental
value are not diminished by those facts.” Id. at cmt. b., illus. 3. However, some courts
have denied loss of use damages where the owner was already unable to use the
property. See generally Metz v. Soares, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 743 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding
the owner of a 1971 Jaguar XKE was not entitled to loss of use damages because the
automobile was registered as non-operational and had not been in his possession for
four years prior to being damaged).
51. See 476 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (App. Div. 1984).
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entitled to damages for loss of use during the time reasonably
required to make repairs . . . .”52 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Koenig v. PurCo Fleet Services, Inc. overturned a decision that
required a commercial tort victim to prove “loss prerequisites”—that
it was open for business and that at least one customer wanted to rent
its car—for each day that loss of use damages were claimed.53
Channeling Lord Halsbury’s famous chair illustration in The Mediana,
the court wrote:
If the court of appeals and Koenig were correct that a
commercial entity must prove a lost opportunity to
recover loss of use damages, then anyone could
wrongfully take possession of a commercially owned
or leased chattel—and eventually return it in a similar
condition—without liability unless the owner could
prove a lost economic opportunity or lost profits.54
Instead of turning directly to English authority like many other
courts, it cited the § 931 of the Restatement to find “there is an
intrinsic loss from the deprivation of property separate and apart
from an out-of-pocket expense.”55 It then held that loss of use
damages could be estimated by using “the reasonable rental value of
a chattel or, alternatively, net lost profits that could have been earned
by using the chattel.”56
The Texas Supreme Court in J&D Towing, LLC v. American
Alternative Insurance Corp. reviewed more than a hundred years of
loss of use jurisprudence from across the country.57 There, the
plaintiff towing company’s tow truck had been totally destroyed by
another driver’s negligence. That driver’s insurance settled for the
policy limits and the plaintiff filed an underinsured motorist claim
with its own insurer for loss of use, which was denied. The issue, as
the court put it, was “whether it should be cheaper to totally destroy
52. Id. at 920. However, other courts have not imposed such a limitation,
especially if there are extenuating circumstances. See Guido v. Hudson Transit Lines,
Inc., 178 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1950) (affirming award of damages for loss of use
where owner of destroyed truck was unable to find a replacement for two years due
to post-war shortages).
53. 285 P.3d 979, 980–81 (Colo. 2012).
54. Id. at 983.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 983–84.
57. See 478 S.W.3d 649, 664–69 (Tex. 2016).
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a truck than it is to partially destroy it.”58 The Texas Supreme Court
reasoned that the measure of damages in tort cases is “fair,
reasonable, and proper compensation . . ..”59 Full and fair
compensation is satisfied by compensating a plaintiff for loss of use
damages based on the rental value of a comparable replacement
during the period of deprivation, even where the vehicle has been
completely destroyed. Further, a plaintiff need not actually rent a
replacement vehicle in order to recover loss of use damages. The
court reviewed the changes made to § 927 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.60 The original Restatement required a plaintiff
whose property was totally destroyed to choose between rental value
or the interest on the market value of their property.61 The
Restatement was later changed to allow a plaintiff to recover both.62
This means that a plaintiff whose property is completely destroyed
may recover the market value of their property, plus interest, as well
as the rental value of that property for the period of deprivation.63
III.

A.

MODERN LOSS OF USE IN ENGLAND AND
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL COURTS

Lord Halsbury’s Argument Prevails in England

The House of Lord’s rejection of Lord Halsbury’s rule was short
lived. Eventually, the English Courts returned to a more lenient loss
of use rule that did not require proof of actual loss. As stated by Lord
Justice Devlin in The Hebridean Coast, the owner of a damaged or
detained ship “has lost the use of his vessel; and whether he could

58. Id. at 653.
59. Id. at 655.
60. See id. at 675–77.
61. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 927 (AM. L. INST. 1939) (“Where a person
is entitled to a judgment for the conversion of a chattel or the destruction of any
legally protected interest in land or other thing, the damages include . . . interest from
the time at which the value is fixed or compensation for the loss of use.”) (emphasis
added).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927 (AM. L. INST. 1979) (explaining that
an award of damages for destroyed property or chattel may include: “interest from
the time at which the value is fixed; and . . . compensation for the loss of use not
otherwise compensated.”) (emphasis added).
63. See id. at cmt. o (citing cases where plaintiffs whose property has been
destroyed may recover the market value plus interest in addition to the rental value
for the period of deprivation).
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have used her for pleasure or business . . . he is entitled to
compensation for loss of use.”64 This is the prevailing view among
English courts today. The exact measure of damages may vary
according to the circumstances of the case but the intrinsic right
recognized by Lord Halsbury to use one’s property and to be
compensated for the loss of that right has been widely adopted by
English courts. As a prominent English treatise states, “[t]he
notorious decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in The Conqueror . . .
would almost certainly not be followed [in England].”65
Indeed, English courts today tend to cite to and follow decisions
such as The Greta Holme and The Mediana as opposed to the earlier
English decisions the U.S. Supreme Court cited in its admiralty cases.
For example, in Dimond v. Lovell, the House of Lords found that “even
where the chattel is non profit earning . . . there may still be scope for
awarding general damages for loss of use.”66 In Lagden v. O’Connor,
Lord Nicholls stated that a plaintiff’s “entitlement to general damages
would not have depended on the degree of use to which he would . . .
have been likely to put it. He had been deprived of the benefit of
having his car available for whatever use he might from time to time
decide upon.”67 He then argued that the cost of providing a
replacement vehicle “is a convenient yardstick by which to measure
the damages payable to the innocent driver for temporary loss of use
of his own car.”68
Later in Piper v. Hales, a plaintiff attempted to recover for the loss
of use of his replica Porsche 917 after its engine was damaged by the
defendant’s driving.69 The court quoted Lord Halsbury to find that
“where by the wrongful act of one man something belonging to
another is either itself so injured as not to be capable of being used or
is taken away so that it cannot be used at all, that of itself is a ground
for damages . . . .”70 Similarly, the Court in Beechwood Birmingham
Ltd. v. Hoyer Group UK Ltd., cited the string of cases from The Greta
Holme to The Hebridean Coast and recognized the general principle
that damages may be recovered regardless of the owner’s use of the
64. [1961] AC 545.
65. REGINALD G. MARSDEN ET AL., MARSDEN ON COLLISIONS AT SEA 579 n.27 (Simon
Gault et al. eds., 13th ed. 2003).
66. [2000] 1 AC 384 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
67. [2004] 1 AC 1067 (HL) [76] (appeal taken from Eng.).
68. Id. at [2].
69. See [2013] EWHC B1 (QB) [1] (appeal taken from Eng.).
70. Id. at [48] (emphasis removed) (citing The Mediana).
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property.71 The Court did, however, explain the distinction between
awarding loss of use damages to an individual versus a for-profit
enterprise, which “constitutes a separate class of case from that in
which an individual claims in respect of a private vehicle used for
convenience rather than profit.”72 Thus, “[w]here a substitute vessel
is hired in to fulfil the role of the damaged vessel, the costs of hiring in
are recoverable. Where the claimant’s fleet is sufficient to provide a
standby, then an award may be made based upon the expenses of
keeping that standby . . . .”73 Otherwise, “the damages awarded are
generally to be calculated on the basis of interest on the capital value
of the damaged ship at the time of the collision.”74 This is not
inconsistent with Lord Halsbury’s rule, which also distinguished
between claims of lost profit from the loss of use of a for-profit vessel
and loss of use of non-profit vessels. In The Mediana, he stated that
“when you are endeavouring to establish the specific loss of profit, or
of something that you otherwise would have got which the law
recognises as special damage . . . you must [show] it, and by precise
evidence . . . .”75 However, “no such principle applies” to general
damages such as loss of use.76
Therefore, where a plaintiff wishes to measure damages in a
commercial sense, they must provide evidence of lost profits. Without
such evidence, the default measure of damages for the loss of use of
personal chattel is the cost of a temporary replacement without
regard for the owner’s actual use. Where the chattel is owned for a
commercial purpose or where the plaintiff’s fleet provides a standby,
the default measure is interest on its capital value or the cost of
keeping the standby.
B. Loss of Right to Use in the American Federal Courts
The back-and-forth nature of the English common law had a
significant impact on the loss of use rules adopted by courts in the
United States. The United States Supreme Court decided The
Conqueror only months before Lord Halsbury wrote his famous
opinion in The Greta Holme, which contradicted the decisions relied
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See [2010] EWCA (Civ) 647, [2011] 1 QB 357 (appeal taken from Eng.).
Id. at [48].
Id. at [45].
Id.
[1900] AC at 117.
Id. at 118.
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upon by the Supreme Court. In Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal v.
United States, Justice Cardozo discussed the differing views among
English and American courts in cases involving demurrage or loss of
use without proof of actual loss.77 By this time, the Courts in England
were following the rules announced in The Valeria and The
Susquehanna rejecting Lord Halsbury’s analysis to once again require
an actual loss.78 Justice Cardozo cited The Susquehanna five times
when deciding that an award for loss of use where no spare vessel was
needed or hired was “erroneous and extravagant.”79 However, the
Justice acknowledged that determining the reasonableness of loss of
use damages requires a review of the specific circumstances.80 Only
then can a court decide “whether the interference with profit or
enjoyment is to be ranked as substance or as shadow.”81 The Court
went on to hold that damages could not be awarded when the
shipowner makes use of other available resources to avoid suffering
any actual loss. Quoting Lord Sumner in The Susquehanna, Justice
Cardozo found that the petitioner could not “get damages based on
the use of a standby when in fact they did very well without one.”82
The United States Supreme Court has not heard an admiralty case
involving demurrage or loss of use since Brooklyn Eastern. It has not
had an opportunity to revisit its holdings in The Conqueror or
Brooklyn Eastern in light of the subsequent developments in English
admiralty law or the large body of state law on loss of use damages.
Both decisions are a product of the evolving state of English law and
reflect views that have been largely rejected by the English courts
today. Thus, unlike most state courts, the Supreme Court has never
adopted Lord Halsbury’s view and lower federal courts hearing
admiralty cases are bound by precedent to apply the actual loss rule

77. See 287 U.S. 170, 174 (1932).
78. See Brownstein, supra note 17, at 489–90 n.134; see also id. at 490.
79. Brooklyn Eastern, 287 U.S. at 174.
80. See generally Recent Decisions: Admiralty–Damages for Loss of Use Based on
Hire of Fictitious Substitute, 19 VA. L. REV. 411, 411–12 (1933).
81. Brooklyn Eastern, 287 U.S. at 174–75. Despite the softened language in
Justice Cardozo’s opinion, courts generally find it did not alter The Conqueror’s
holding that loss of use damages are not allowed in admiralty for vessels used for
pleasure. See e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 n.12 (9th Cir. 1973)
(finding that Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Brooklyn Eastern did not alter The
Conqueror’s holding); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Muradyan, No. CV 03-351, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18643, at *17–18 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2003) (following Oppen’s holding that Brooklyn
Eastern did not alter The Conqueror).
82. Brooklyn Eastern, 287 U.S. at 177 (internal quotations removed).
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of The Conqueror.83 Courts have expressed disapproval and criticized
the rule even when following the Supreme Court’s precedent. For
example in Nordasilla Corp. v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp.,
the court acknowledged that The Conqueror remained the law but that
its application “strikes one as fundamentally unfair” and “appears on
the surface to be draconian.”84 The court had trouble with the idea
that a yacht owner could be deprived of the use of their property and
be denied damages simply because it was used for pleasure: “[o]ne
wonders why the tortfeasor should benefit from the fact that an asset
owner chose to forgo commercial operations when there is far less
speculative nature or other question concerning ascertainable
damages in these circumstances than there is concerning general
damages in the run-of-the-mill personal injury case.”85 The court in
Northern Assurance Co. of America v. Heard criticized The Conqueror
for “its overreading of prior precedent and its faulty policy basis.”86 It
further suggested the rule was based on the Supreme Court’s refusal
to grant one of the richest men in America damages for the “loss of
one of his many recreational diversions.”87 The problem, as the court
noted, was that depriving a Vanderbilt of loss of use damages barred
many working shipowners from recovering as well.88
In non-admiralty cases, such as diversity cases involving state
law causes of action, federal courts have been able to avoid the rigid
rule of The Conqueror. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, federal courts are required to apply relevant
state law when deciding state law claims.89 By the time Erie was
83. See Ebony v. Dredge Stuyvesant, 804 F. Supp. 898, 902 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(applying the actual loss rule and two-part test from The Clarence); see also Slater v.
Texaco, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1099, 1112 (D. Del. 1981) (also applying the actual loss rule
and two part test from The Clarence).
84. 1982 AMC 99, 106 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff’d, 679 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1982).
85. Id.
86. 755 F. Supp. 2d 295, 302 (D. Mass. 2010).
87. Id. at 303.
88. See id. (“In this, the categorical rule created for a Vanderbilt falls harshly on
the [plaintiffs], calling to mind Anatole France’s description of the ‘majestic equality
of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep upon the bridges . . . .’”).
89. See 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET. AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 646 (7th ed. 2015) (“Once Erie denied the existence of general
law unattached to any sovereign, it became necessary to determine whether—and
under what criteria—federal or state law would apply in such cases.”); Exxon
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decided, most state courts had already adopted Lord Halsbury’s rule
for loss of use damages. This led to a situation where Erie-bound
federal courts indirectly followed English common law—as adopted
by most state courts—rather than the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
its admiralty cases.
For example, in Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschaapij, N.V. (K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines) v. United Technologies
Corp. (hereinafter “K.L.M.”), the Second Circuit applied Connecticut’s
adoption of Lord Halsbury’s rule in Cook v. Packard Car Co. of New
York while acknowledging Justice Cardozo’s opinion to the contrary
in Brooklyn Eastern.90 The district court followed Brooklyn Eastern
and refused to consider rental value as a measure of damages because
the airline would have been required to make lease payments on the
aircraft regardless of when it was in use.91 However, the Second
Circuit reversed, finding that the deprivation of the airline’s right to
use the aircraft was itself compensable and the actual amount paid
under the lease for the aircraft was an appropriate measure of
damages.92
Thus, most American state courts, lower federal courts, and
courts in England agree that damage or detention of chattel that
deprives the owner of its use violates an intrinsic right and that such
an injury is compensable. The lone exception is in American admiralty
law, where the United States Supreme Court has yet to adopt the
approach taken by the English courts and American state courts. The
strong resistance among lower federal courts as well as the evolution
of loss of right to use in English and American state courts suggests it
is only a matter of time before the United States Supreme Court
applies the modern approach to admiralty as well.

Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489–90 (2008) (“These restrictions do not apply
to federal courts sitting in admiralty because the Constitution’s grant of jurisdiction
over admiralty and maritime cases implies that federal courts will proceed “in the
manner of a common law court . . . .”).
90. See 610 F.2d 1052, 1055–57 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that “[u]nder [the Erie
Doctrine], we must apply a state law of damages” and that Brooklyn Eastern “has no
direct bearing on the question before us which must be decided under [state] law.”).
91. See id. at 1055.
92. See id. at 1057–59; see also Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Ogden Allied Aviation
Servs., 726 F. Supp. 1389, 1396–97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that “[t]o an airline,
ownership of a [Boeing] 747 represents a bundle of valuable opportunities . . . Those
opportunities are all temporarily lost when a tortfeasor renders the aircraft
unserviceable for a period of time. That opportunity cost cannot be valueless; it must
be worth something.”).
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LOSS OF RIGHT TO USE IN CONNECTICUT

Connecticut’s law on loss of right to use is well-settled and has
been cited by courts across the United States.93 The Connecticut
Supreme Court recognized in Cook v. Packard Car Co. that property
ownership vests the owner with rights and the mere deprivation of
his right to use is itself compensable. Thus, plaintiffs need not prove
that they actually would have used their property during the time the
defendant’s negligence made it unavailable. “These are the rights of
property which ownership vests in him, and whether he, in fact, avails
himself of his right of use, does not in the least affect the value of his
use.”94 Like many state court decisions on loss of right to use during
the early twentieth century, the decision rested upon the prevailing
English admiralty law at the time that recognized the intrinsic rights
which property ownership vests in the owner.95
A. Damages for Loss of Use Do Not Depend on the Owner’s Actual
Use
Whether a plaintiff may recover damages for the loss of the right
to use his property does not depend on whether the property would
have been used profitably. In Cook, it was stated that “[a]n automobile
owner who expects to use his car for pleasure only, has the same legal
right to its continued use and possession as an owner who expects to
93. See, e.g., PurCo Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Koenig, 240 P.3d 435, 445 (Colo. App.
2010) (citing Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 470 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D.
Conn. 1979)); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 n.7 ( Ct. App.
1972) (citing Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co., 92 A. 413); Rocha v. McClure Motors, Inc.,
395 P.2d 191, 195 (Wash. 1964) (describing Justice Wheeler’s concurring opinion in
Cook as the “definitive statement of the guiding principle involved in [loss of use
cases]”); Hanson v. Hall, 279 N.W. 227, 231 (Minn. 1938) (citing Longworth v.
McGrath, 143 A. 845 (Conn. 1928)); Rickenberg v. Capitol Garage, 249 P. 121, 125
(Utah 1926) (citing Cook); Consol. Nat’l Bank of Tucson v. Cunningham, 238 P. 332,
334 (Ariz. 1925) (adopting the rule from Cook); Larson Brothers Wholesale Grocery
Co. v. Kansas City, 224 P. 47, 50 (Kan. 1924) (citing Cook); Perkins v. Brown, 177 S.W.
1158, 1159 (Tenn. 1915) (citing Cook and Brown v. Southbury, 1 A. 819 (Conn.
1885)).
94. Cook, 92 A. at 418 (Wheeler, J., concurring); see also Ralph N. Blakeslee Co. v.
Rigo, 109 A. 173, 175 (Conn. 1920) (finding that recovery for depreciation in value
was insufficient to fully indemnify the plaintiff because “where the property has a
usable value, the loss of the use is the damage suffered and the value of that use the
measure of damage.”).
95. See Cook, 92 A. at 416 (comparing the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in The Conqueror with Lord Halsbury’s ruling in The Mediana before
following the rule of Lord Halsbury).
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rent his car for profit . . . .”96 The fact that the property owner has not
suffered an actual pecuniary loss does not diminish his right to
substantial damages because “the legal basis for a substantial
recovery . . . is the same in one case as in the other.”97 The slight risk
of overcompensating a tort victim who has not shown actual loss is
not a sufficient reason for denying recovery, for “[i]f there must be a
windfall certainly it is more just that the injured person shall profit
therefrom, rather than the wrongdoer shall be relieved of his full
responsibility for his wrongdoing.”98
However, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Cook did not provide
a sweeping rule to be applied in all cases. “Manifestly, no general rule
for this class of cases can be laid down, except that the jury should
award fair and reasonable compensation according to the
circumstances of each case.”99 In the years since Cook, the law on loss
of right to use has further developed. In Hawkins v. Garford Trucking
Co., the court explained the essential elements to be used when
determining what is “fair and reasonable,” such as the “market rental
value, less the proportion of this rental value which covers the wear
and tear, and depreciation in the use of the automobile, and the period
of necessary deprivation of use.”100 These cases were followed by
Longworth v. McGrath,101 and Hansen v. Costello,102 where the Court
again rejected arguments that plaintiffs must show actual loss in
order to recover for the deprivation of the right to use their property.
In Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., it was made clear that this principle
applies equally whether the property is a luxury item used for
pleasure or if it is used in a commercial enterprise.103
The rental value of property may provide a measure of loss of
right to use damages even where a substitute has not been rented.
One of the prevalent themes in Connecticut’s loss of right to use law is
that a plaintiff’s right to use their property and their right to recover
96. Id. at 415.
97. Id.; see also Doolittle v. Otis Elevator Co., 118 A. 818, 818 (Conn. 1922)
(stating that “it is possible that the cost of repairs plus fair compensation for the loss
of use, may exceed the reasonable market value of the car at the time of the accident
. . . .”).
98. Marciano v. Jimenez, 151 A.3d 1280, 1285 (Conn. 2016) (quoting Saint
Bernard Sch. of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 95 A.3d 1063 (Conn. 2014)).
99. Cook, 92 A. at 416.
100. 114 A. 94, 95 (Conn. 1921).
101. See 143 A. 845, 846 (Conn. 1928).
102. See 5 A.2d 880, 881 (Conn. 1939).
103. See 92 A. 665, 667 (Conn. 1914).
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damages for its deprivation does not depend on how they choose to
use it. Thus, recovery of rental value even where no substitute is
procured is not about compensating for a pecuniary loss. For
example, the Second Circuit in K.L.M. cited multiple Connecticut cases
to conclude that “[t]he theory behind the allowance of damages for
loss of use is that it is not the actual use but the Right to use that is
compensable.”104 The court in K.L.M. continued by saying, “[i]t is no
answer then to say to the victim of the tort: since you have failed to
prove that you would have made a net profit from use of the damaged
property, you may take nothing. For it is the right to use that marks
the value.”105
The understanding that loss of use is fundamentally about the
loss of right to use is also embodied in modern Connecticut insurance
regulations. A 1987 bulletin from the Connecticut Insurance
Department clarified that a claimant may recover for loss of use even
where no rental costs were incurred.106 In 2007, another bulletin
reiterated that property damage includes “the loss of use thereof” and
that claimants may recover for loss of use even where no substitute
has been rented.107 Connecticut insurance regulations define loss of
use as “the amount representing the reasonable value to the claimant
for the deprivation of the use of the claimant’s vehicle during the
period reasonably required to make repairs or replace the vehicle,
regardless of whether the claimant has incurred expenses.”108
The period reasonably required in order to make repairs or
replace the vehicle is not defined by any Connecticut statute or
regulation. It is generally understood to mean the entire period of
time for which the owner is deprived of their vehicle while it is under
repair or the time which it would take to replace the vehicle using
ordinary diligence.109 This includes the time it takes to determine if
the vehicle is in fact repairable, the time spent doing repairs, as well
as reasonable delay in procuring necessary parts or supplies. This
varies significantly by jurisdiction but most courts hold that even
104. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaapij, N.V. (K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines) v.
United Techs. Corp., 610 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir. 1979).
105. Id.
106. Conn. Ins. Dep’t Bulletin CL-1 (Mar. 17, 1987).
107. See Bulletin CL-1-07, State of Conn. Ins. Dep’t (July 20, 2007),
https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/CID/bullCL107pdf.pdf
[https://portal.ct.gov/CID/Bulletins/Archive-Bulletins.
108. Conn. Agencies Regs. § 38a-10-2(f) (1992).
109. See 8 AM. JUR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 1187, Westlaw
(database updated Feb. 2022).
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extended delays are reasonable if the owner himself was not
responsible for the delay.110 In Brooks Transportation Co. v.
McCutcheon, evidence that it took two months to replace a destroyed
tractor due to wartime restrictions was allowed to be submitted to the
jury.111 Similarly, in Lyle v. Seller, loss of use damages were reasonable
where the repair was delayed because parts had to be shipped from
the East Coast to San Francisco.112 Some cases even hold that delays
caused by the plaintiff’s inability to pay for repairs will justify
damages covering the entire period. One example of this is Rivere v.
Bellefonte Insurance Co., where a plaintiff was awarded fourteen
months of rental costs because he was unable to pay the bill to repair
his own vehicle.113
The reasoning is similar to that of awarding loss of use damages
based on rental value even where there is no rental vehicle due to a
lack of resources. The fact that a plaintiff’s vehicle repair has been
delayed due to something out of their control—whether by wartime
restrictions, difficulty in finding parts, or inability to pay—does not
absolve the defendant’s responsibility to compensate them for losing
the right to use their property.114 “It is a well-settled principle of [tort]
law that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him.”115 Allowing a
negligent driver to reap the benefit of the victims misfortune violates
that principle.
The 2007 insurance bulletin also explains that no loss of use
payment is required where a “reasonably equivalent” substitute is
provided or where one is offered but refused.116 The law is not clear
on exactly what constitutes a “reasonably equivalent” vehicle but
several factors have been considered. For example, Rigakos v. Oneill
involved a driver of a Mercedes-Benz C300 that was provided a

110. See C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Recovery For Loss of Use of Motor Vehicle
Damaged or Destroyed, 18 A.L.R.3d 497 (2022).
111. See 154 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
112. See 233 P. 345, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924).
113. See 388 So. 2d 75, 76 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
114. E.g., Mondragon v. Austin, 954 S.W.2d 191, 194–95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that denying damages to a plaintiff that could not afford a rental vehicle
would amount to punishing them for their lack of resources).
115. Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 408 A.2d 260, 264 (Conn. 1979). See also
Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891); Lagden v. O’Connor [2004] 1 AC
1067 (appeal taken from Eng.) (finding that “a negligent driver must take his victim
as he finds him” and allowing damages for plaintiff’s cost of using a credit hire
company to obtain a rental vehicle).
116. Bulletin CL-1-07, supra note 107.
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newer-but-still-inferior Dodge Charger.117 Though the court did not
agree with the amount the Plaintiff sought, it did find that the two
vehicles were not comparable and awarded the difference in value
because the Dodge lacked the amenities and cachet of a MercedesBenz.118 Similarly, in Leszcynski v. Leblond, a driver was awarded loss
of use damages based on the difference in rental value between her
brand new Toyota Highlander and the Nissan Rogue she was
provided.119 Though the disparity between the two vehicles may not
be as significant as the difference between a Mercedes and a Dodge,
the court decided the two vehicles were not comparable because the
Nissan was smaller, had less technology, and did not accommodate
the plaintiff’s needs.120
B. “Fair and Reasonable Compensation” and Deductions for
Depreciation
Connecticut law is clear that the right to recover for loss of use
derives from the loss of one’s right to use their property and does not
depend on how they chose to use it. The law is also clear that rental
value is an appropriate element of damage even where no substitute
was rented. Connecticut law is less clear, however, on whether
plaintiffs must take a deduction from the market rental value of the
replacement vehicle for depreciation. Some modern cases cite
Anderson v. Gengras Motors, Inc.,121 as requiring such a deduction.122
However, the Anderson court only went as far to say that “[n]o definite
general rule can be laid down, except that the award . . . should be for
fair and reasonable compensation according to the circumstances of
each case . . . .”123 Anderson relies heavily on Cook, which does not
require such a depreciation deduction in all cases. Additionally, the
pre-automobile cases upon which Anderson and Cook are based do not
require a deduction for depreciation. In addition to the leading
English authorities at the time, the court also looked to Brown v. Town
117. See No. FST-CV16-6027436-S, 2017 LEXIS 4478, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Sept. 11, 2017).
118. See id. at *5–6.
119. See No. WWM-CV18-6015594-S, at 2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2020).
120. See id.
121. See 109 A.2d 502 (Conn. 1954).
122. See, e.g., Ramos v. GoAuto Ctrs. of Meriden, LLC, No. 15-CV-00314, 2016 WL
7424119, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 23, 2016) (reading Anderson as requiring a deduction
for depreciation).
123. Anderson, 109 A.2d at 504.
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of Southbury,124 in which a horse, carriage, and harness were damaged
due to a defect in a town road. The Brown court recognized loss of use
and ruled that “[t]he loss was the direct and natural consequence of
the injury. That it was a proper element of damage is too clear for
argument.”125 Brown also allowed an award for “depreciation in the
market value of the horse” as an additional “proper element of
damage to be allowed,” analogous to diminution in value.126
The court in Cook was not concerned with the dollar amount of
depreciation, but rather with fundamental fairness. The opinion
noted that rental value includes not just depreciation but also “the
overhead expenses and the profits of carrying on the business of
renting motor-cars.”127 Neither Anderson nor any modern court
discusses the rental company’s overhead and profits, the plaintiff’s
actual use of a car, or the cost of employing chauffeurs.128 Cook does
not preclude a modern, simplified approach, where the plaintiff’s loss
of use is based on the market rental value of his vehicle, as long as the
award is “fair and reasonable compensation.”129 In fact, Cook and its
progeny suggest that the simplified approach—market rental value
for the period of deprivation without deductions for depreciation—is
the definition of “fair and reasonable compensation.”
After Cook, but as far back as 1929, the Connecticut Supreme
Court has questioned the appropriateness of a deduction for
depreciation. In Mastrianni v. Apothecaries Hall Co., it noted that the
trial court had no basis for making a deduction for depreciation for
the six Sundays the vehicle was not used.130 That is true for personal
use, however, it may be appropriate for depreciation to be deducted
in the commercial context.131 Calculations for the daily cost of
124. See 1 A. 819 (Conn. 1885).
125. Id. at 824.
126. Cook v. Packard Motor Car Co. of N.Y., 92 A. 413, 415 (Conn. 1914)
(discussing the holding in Brown).
127. Id.
128. Some courts have noted that the daily rental rate includes profit,
maintenance costs, overhead, and repairs but have not attempted to calculate their
value. See e.g., Leszcynski v. Leblond, No. WWM-CV18-6015594-S (Conn. Super. Ct.
Conn. Oct. 20, 2020) (assigning a rental value equal to twice the rate paid for the
replacement vehicle—a value that fell between the replacement vehicle’s daily rate
and the market rate for the plaintiff’s vehicle—rather than attempting to calculate
deductions).
129. Cook, 92 A. at 416.
130. See 146 A. 819, 819 (Conn. 1929).
131. See Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaapij, N.V. (K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines)
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gasoline and oil as well as depreciation are sometimes made during
the normal course of business but similar calculations are not made
with respect to property owned for personal use. Deducting
depreciation from loss of right to use damages based on rental value
would require the court to speculate about the business practices of
non-party rental companies. Taken as a whole, the line of historical
cases beginning with Brown and ending with Anderson, contain no
bright-line rule that all plaintiffs claiming loss of use damages must
deduct that portion of rental value attributable to depreciation. None
of the reported cases, historical or modern, contain a full discussion
of how plaintiffs should prove depreciation, which is likely to be
cumbersome, speculative, and unobtainable for rental car companies
that are not parties to the action. This is perhaps one reason why the
Connecticut Insurance Department regulations adopt the modern,
simplified approach.132 Deductions for depreciation outside the
commercial context are unworkable and unjustified by the historical
loss of right to use cases.
V.

DEFINING FAIR AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION
FOR LOSS OF RIGHT TO USE

Despite two hundred years of English and American
jurisprudence, many courts still struggle with determining what
amounts to “fair and reasonable compensation” for loss of right to use.
From its origins in English admiralty law to its modern understanding
in the United States, loss of use is fundamentally about one’s
deprivation of the right to use. When a property owner is deprived of
the right to use his or her property, it is the deprivation itself which is
compensable. Whether or not they would have used the property
profitably is immaterial when deciding loss of right to use damages.
As recognized by Lord Halsbury over a century ago, one cannot escape
liability for stealing property if they simply return it and show the
owner would not have used it anyway. Similarly, when one’s
v. United Techs. Corp., 610 F.2d 1052, 1056 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that “the damages
for loss of use of a commercial aircraft, particularly a leased aircraft, should not be
[c]alculated in precisely the same fashion as for an owned automobile.”); see also Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 470 F. Supp. 105, 108–10 (D. Conn. 1979)
(finding it may be appropriate to require evidence of depreciation in the commercial
context where plaintiffs have already calculated it).
132. See Conn. Agencies Regs. § 38a-10-2(f) (1992); Bulletin CL-1-07, State of
Conn.
Ins.
Dep’t
(July
20,
2007),
https://portal.ct.gov//media/CID/bullCL107pdf.pdf.
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automobile or other chattel becomes damaged and must be detained
for repairs, the wrongdoer may be held liable for that detention. This
simplified view of what is actually being compensated allows for an
equally simple measure of damages for loss of use that avoids
investigation into the owner’s intentions.
Having established that loss of use is about the right to use rather
than actual use, defining “fair and reasonable compensation” is much
easier. The simplest measure of loss of use damages is the daily
market rental value multiplied by the number of days the owner has
been deprived of its use. This provides courts with a simplified
formula for awarding loss of use damages that requires less judicial
speculation or investigation into the owner’s intentions. This
approach is also supported by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§
928 and 931, which set the market rental value as the minimum
recovery for loss of use damages.133
Rental value is typically easy to obtain and is easily understood.
Because it represents the amount someone would be willing to pay
for the use of property, it is the best estimate of the value of an owner’s
loss of use.134 It doubles as a way to measure both the cost the owner
would have to pay to temporarily replace their property as well as the
value of their opportunity loss since the owner could have chosen to
use their property profitably, such as offering it for rent. Absent a
showing that the owner of the detained property was actually
engaged in a more profitable enterprise, the daily rental value
multiplied by the days of deprivation should be the preferred measure
of loss of use damages.135 Employing this method has several benefits.
It ensures plaintiffs are fairly compensated for being deprived of the
right to use their property and spares courts from having to speculate
or make difficult and awkward calculations. As discussed in the
comments to § 931 of the Restatement, market rental value also
allows for variations depending on the circumstances surrounding
133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 928, 931 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
134. Rental value has also been called “usable value.” See STUART M. SPEISER ET
AL., 2 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 8:30 (2020).
135. Awarding damages for loss of use does not preclude other damages, such
as loss of sales or harm to business. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 931 cmt. e
(AM. L. INST. 1979) (explaining that “[i]n addition to the value of the use during a
period of detention, the owner is entitled to damages for the harm legally caused to
the land or chattel or to the owner’s business by the deprivation.”). The comment
further explains that if the owner had a specific use for the property and the use no
longer exists due to the detention, compensation may be awarded for that loss. See
id. Additionally, illus. 5 shows that an owner is also entitled to damages for business
harms if their inability to procure a substitute leads to further harm. See id.
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the loss of use.136 Courts have long been concerned with awarding
loss of use damages when the damaged property would not have been
used profitably, such as providing rental value to a shipowner during
winter months. Market rental value takes care of these concerns
automatically by providing only the rental value the property owner
could have received at the time of deprivation. The value of seasonal
rentals—e.g., ski chalets in the winter, convertible vehicles in the
summer, etc.—adjust according to seasonal supply and demand. If the
rental rate for a convertible car is much lower in December than in
June, courts using market value need not be concerned with
overcompensating the owner because this rate would represent the
value of his vehicle in the present rental market.
To maintain the simplicity of rental value as a measure of
damages, it should not include deductions for depreciation or other
costs associated with rental property. Using the market rental value
as loss of use damages without deductions is fair because it puts thirdparty claimants on par with first-party and real property claimants.
In first-party insurance claims, the loss of use is determined by the
rental cost of a similar vehicle in the plaintiff’s geographic area
without regard to deductions for depreciation, gas, oil, insurance, or a
driver. Deductions for depreciation or other costs may, however, be
appropriate for loss of use in the commercial context where the
information is readily available and would require little to no
speculation. Property owners generally do not make complex
calculations regarding depreciation and maintenance and have no
method for determining the hypothetical cost of overhead. Such
deductions effectively turn a simple measure into a complicated
investigation into the business practices of rental companies that are
usually not parties to the litigation. This is not a concern in most
commercial contexts, such as loss of use of a rental car. In such a case,
the rental company would have likely already made calculations for
depreciation and other costs. Thus, deducting these from the rental
value would require no judicial speculation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of loss of use damages is to compensate the tort
136. See id. at cmt. b. (“The use to which the chattel or land is commonly put and
the time of year in which the detention or deprivation occurs are, however, to be
taken into consideration as far as these factors bear upon the value of the use to the
owner or the rental value.”).
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victim for the deprivation of the right to use their property. This right
does not depend upon the manner in which the owner decides to use
the property and, consequently, neither should the measure of
damages depend upon the owner’s actual use. An owner may choose
to use their property in a profitable manner at any time. When a
tortfeasor’s conduct deprives them of their property, they also
deprive the owner of the right to put it towards a profitable or
personal use. That deprivation itself is compensable.
These principles are derived from early twentieth century
English admiralty law, which recognized this intrinsic right vested by
property ownership. To the English courts, whether the property
owner would have actually used their property was irrelevant
because the right to use the property is what marks the value.
American state courts quickly adopted this superior reasoning to
award loss of use damages even where no actual loss had occurred.
While these courts largely agreed that deprivation of property was
itself compensable regardless of how the owner would have used it, if
at all, courts have struggled to develop a measure of damages for loss
of right to use. Connecticut’s loss of right to use law is among the most
cited in the United States but even the Connecticut Supreme Court has
failed to define what “fair and reasonable compensation” means for
loss of right to use. This has left trial courts with little guidance for
calculating damages where a plaintiff has been wrongfully deprived
of the right to use their property.
Courts need a workable measure of damages that requires little
judicial speculation and no investigation into the property owner’s
intentions. Daily market rental value is the best measure to provide
full and fair compensation to property owners because it represents
the value of the daily use of their property. This simplified approach
should be adopted as a default measure of damages where a property
owner has been deprived of the right to use their property but cannot
prove actual loss. Tortfeasors should not benefit from the tort victim’s
decision to forgo a profitable use or failure to obtain a replacement. A
simplified approach based on market rental value is an easily
workable standard that requires minimal speculation and no inquiry
into the owner’s intentions. Such a rule awards fair compensation and
uses a measure of value directly tied to the harm for which
compensation is sought—deprivation of the right to use one’s
property.
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